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THE NEW HOME ECONOMICS 
Jane E. Larson' 
Sex and Reason, By Richard A. Posner.2 Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 1992. Pp. vii, 458. $29.95. 
Surely Judge Richard Posner has titled his new book Sex and 
Reason with pointed irony, playing with the prevailing convention 
by which we speak of sex versus reason. For what could be less 
reasonable than sex, that realm of human experience both feared 
and celebrated for its irrationality?J Yet the central premise of Sex 
and Reason is that a deep structure of rationality governs human 
sexual desire and behavior. With this book, Posner sets out to chal-
lenge the received notion that sex is essentially irrational, and thus 
joins forces with Nobel laureate Gary Becker4 to conquer for eco-
nomics the last great frontier of human activity as yet uncolonized 
for the kingdom of rational choice. 
Posner's new book has two other ambitious goals: to provide a 
sweeping historical and cross-cultural introduction to human sexual 
mores and conduct; and to argue for sexual deregulation in the 
United States, extending his strong economic libertarianism into the 
realm of sexual policy. Consistent with the classical liberal commit-
ment to limited government, Posner believes that individuals should 
be free to govern their own sexual conduct except where it causes 
harm or intrudes on the rights of others. 
Although Posner's "liberatory" history and "libertarian" pol-
I. Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. I am grateful 
to Lisa Brush, Martha Ertman, Linda Hirshman, Keith Hylton, Jonathan Knee and Joseph 
Miller for comments, and to the Bruce M. Gordon Fund of the Northwestern University 
School of Law for research support. 
2. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, 
University of Chicago Law School. 
3. See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, "Only Grey Matter"? Richard Posner's Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Sex, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1689, 1725 (1992) (criticizing Posner for failing to con-
front the "Dionysian" qualities of sex, that "mysterious and awesome side to sexual experi-
ence" in which "only a risk so terrible that it can annihilate makes true joy possible"). 
4. See Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family (Harv. U. Press, enlarged ed. 1991). 
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icy position have attracted the most attention to Sex and Reason, 
his explanatory theory of human sexual rationality should be the 
most discussed aspect of the book. Elsewhere, Sex and Reason has 
been criticized as bad economics.s Yet political critics, particularly 
feminists, were slower to respond, perhaps because Posner's analy-
sis upends conventional categories of gender criticism. 6 Whereas 
feminists are primed to resist the familiar "woman is to nature as 
man is to culture" formulation of gender hierarchy, 1 Posner has 
crafted a sexual politics in which the preferred position (i.e., the 
male position) is the biologically determined one. Sex and Reason 
is the story of biologically determined Man and culturally malleable 
Woman. But if the justifications for gender hierarchy have changed 
with this book, the bottom line has not; Posner's upending of con-
ventional categories does not alter the hierarchy of men over wo-
men. A feminist reading of Sex and Reason thus reveals a familiar 
picture: Another supposedly neutral norm-this time, economic 
and scientific rationality-turns out once again to justify a male-
superior social order.s 
I. THE EMPIRE OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
In the last decade, economists have aggressively expanded the 
scope of their inquiry and influence. Where once the discipline of 
economics seemed by definition confined to the world of commerce, 
it is now common to hear scholars refer to virtually all realms of 
life, including sexual and family life, 9 as "markets." What unifies 
economic accounts of matters as seemingly disparate as the adop-
tion of children and the sale of automobiles is an underlying vision 
5. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Flirting With Science: Richard Posner on the Bioeconomics 
of Sexual Man, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 479, 481 (1992) (book review); Martin Zelder, Incom-
pletely Reasoned Sex: A Review of Posner's Somewhat Misleading Guide to the Economic 
Analysis of Sex and Family Law, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1584, 1584 (1993). 
6. But see Symposium on Sex and Reason, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 473 (1993) (feminist or 
lesbian feminist critical reviews of Sex and Reason). See also Richard A. Posner, The Radical 
Feminist Critique of Sex and Reason, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 515 (1993) (response). 
7. See Sherry B. Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture? in Michelle Z. 
Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, eds., Woman, Culture, and Society 67 (Stanford U. Press, 
1974). 
8. "[W]hat has passed as a humanistically impartial vocabulary of power, reason, mo-
rality, interests, autonomy, justice, history, theory, progress, and enlightenment is actually 
imbued with the gendered masculine meanings and values." Christine DiStefano, Configura-
tions of Masculinity: A Feminist Perspective on Modern Political Theory 4 (Cornell U. Press, 
1991). 
9. See, e.g., Becker, A Treatise on the Family (cited in note 4) (family); Margaret F. 
Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 203 (1990) (engagement and courtship); 
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, ch. 5 (3d ed. 1986) (family); Elisabeth M. 
Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. Legal Stud. 323 
(1978) (adoption). 
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of human nature and purpose. In the economic model, rational in-
dividuals shape the world by single-minded pursuit of self-interest. 
Where economists once conceived of "rationality" (as lay people 
probably still do) as conscious decisions made using the faculty of 
human reason, Posner is among an influential group of economic 
thinkers who now expansively claim that any choice suited to an 
actor's ends-whether those ends are acknowledged or uncon-
scious-maximizes self-interest, and hence may be called "ra-
tional." In Sex and Reason, Posner argues that rational choices 
need not necessarily be conscious choices, but merely choices suited 
to an actor's ends.w Thus if a Wall Street investment banker sacri-
fices her affluent lifestyle in order to work for the homeless, an econ-
omist would insist that she is as bent on advancing self-interest as 
her former officemates. That the homeless activist maximizes her 
utility through altruism and the investment banker through mate-
rial gain is a distinction of no consequence to the economist. 
In this expansionist move, economists posit their discipline as 
more than just another social science or political theory, but rather 
as a meta-theory of human nature, uniquely fundamental in its ca-
pacity to explain behavior and institutions and to predict future out-
comes. An assertion that threads through Posner's work in general, 
and his new book in particular, is the claim that economics has 
more positive explanatory force than other social sciences, and 
greater normative insight and moral legitimacy than its rivals such 
as philosophy, religion, or ethics.It This new economics may 
rightly be called "imperialistic." 
Yet even as economic theory argues that the tendency to en-
gage in cost-benefit calculation is inherently human, the discipline 
has lacked grounding for this controversial assertion about human 
nature, making rational choice theory an unsatisfying account of 
human nature to many. Anthropologists, sociologists, psycholo-
gists, theologians, artists and travelers have long reminded us that 
other cultures and subcultures begin from more communitarian or 
10. Posner began to develop this idea in earlier works, e.g., Richard A. Posner, 
Problems of Jurisprudence 169-70 (Harv. U. Press, 1990) (idea of "optimal" choice carries no 
necessary implication that strategizing involved is conscious). 
II. As applied to sexuality, for example, Posner indicates that the economic theory is 
the "most promising theory" of sexuality we are likely to have for some time. In distinguish-
ing his theory from competitors, including sociology, psychology, jurisprudence, philosophy, 
feminism, history and anthropology, he claims his approach is more than just another in an 
"endless procession of theories of sexuality," but "incorporates, integrates, and transcends 
the perspectives, insights, and findings of the other theories of sexuality that can fairly be 
described as either scientific or social scientific." Frankly moral theories of sexuality, such as 
religions or some philosophical views, Posner does not discuss at any length in Sex and Rea-
son, because they make no claim to a scientific basis. 
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spiritual assumptions, principles that they consider to be as unques-
tionably fundamental an aspect of human nature as the self-inter-
estedness characteristic of mainstream Western culture. 
The most ambitious goal of Sex and Reason, then, is metaphys-
ical-to justify the rational choice model as a universal description 
of human nature, and a comprehensive explanation for human be-
havior. Joining forces with sociobiologists, Posner claims that the 
utility maximization to which economists refer is really an expres-
sion of the fundamental genetic struggle for reproductive fitness, a 
behavior inscribed through natural selection in the genes of all 
members of the human species. Renaming his synthetic theory 
"bioeconomics," Posner describes evolutionary biology as "a paral-
lel mode of inquiry to economic analysis," "if not a foundation of 
my analysis, continuous with it." Both theories analyze rational be-
havior in the sense of fitting of means to ends, he points out, with 
the difference being that the rational maximizer in evolutionary the-
ory is the gene, and in economics it is the individual.l2 
As applied to sexuality, Posner's bioeconomic theory explains 
as biologically determined the persistent and repeating patterns of 
human sexual behavior throughout history and across cultures. 
The tendency for these sexual behaviors is coded into human genes, 
he argues, and these behaviors persist because they have been tried 
and tested as optimal evolutionary strategies for the human species. 
Posner is careful to point out (as most evolutionary biologists do) 
that our genes incline us to certain sexual behaviors, but do not 
immutably determine our behavior. Within the broad boundaries of 
biologically driven sexual preferences, human beings are rational 
creatures who strive to maximize their sexual satisfaction by choos-
ing certain partners and sex acts over others, and disdaining other 
sexual options. Whether the disfavored partners, acts, or values are 
decried as "unnatural," "immoral" or merely erotically uninspiring, 
Posner argues that the real causal factor in human sexual choices is 
not culture or morality, but instead genetic efficiency. 
An example that conveys the flavor of Posner's bioeconomic 
12. The fusion of economics and evolutionary biology has been noted by other law and 
economics theorists. Richard Epstein, for example, has argued that the Darwinian model of 
natural selection provides the conceptual grounding for the extension of rational choice the-
ory into analysis of unconscious choices. See Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Founda-
tions of Natural Law, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 713 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, The 
Varieties of Self-Interest, 8 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 102 (1990). See also Jack Hirshleifer, Econom-
ics/rom a Biological Viewpoint, 20 J. Law & Econ. I, 5 (1977) (listing borrowings by biolo-
gists of economic concepts and arguing for theoretical consistency of economic and 
evolutionary biological approaches); Gary S. Becker, Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: 
Economics and Sociobiology, 14 J. Econ. Lit. 817 (1976) (noting consistency between premises 
of sociobiological theory and economics). 
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analysis is his discussion in Sex and Reason of "opportunistic ho-
mosexuality." Posner is intrigued by the fact that in many 
"macho" (his term) cultures (e.g., ancient Athens or the modern 
Middle East), male homosexual encounters are quite common and 
more easily accepted than in more sexually egalitarian cultures such 
as our own. These patriarchal cultures fiercely condemn 
nonmarital sexual activity among wives and daughters, and highly 
value female virginity and chastity, often to the point of sequester-
ing female family members in order to guard these "assets." In 
these societies, says Posner, the sexual inaccessibility of women is a 
problem of "high search costs" for heterosexual men, which in-
creases the benefit to such men of finding other (although less pre-
ferred) outlets, primarily sex with other men. Such "opportunistic" 
homosexual encounters do not mark the men involved as "real" 
homosexuals-that is, men whose preference for same-sex partners 
would remain stable no matter how sexually available women are. 
Opportunistic homosexuals are men who will "substitute" a man 
for a woman as a sexual partner when the "cost" of a woman is too 
high. 
In similar fashion throughout Sex and Reason, Posner uses 
economic concepts to explain sexual choices, such as "complemen-
tarity" (a reduction in the cost of one good effectively increases the 
demand for another good, e.g., better access to birth control triggers 
more heterosexual intercourse), "substitution" (e.g., if heterosexual 
intercourse is costly or unavailable, rates of masturbation or same-
sex contacts are higher), "search costs" (e.g., difficulty in finding a 
pool of partners drives gays and lesbians from rural areas and small 
towns to large cities), "inferior goods" (e.g., the higher incidence of 
male homosexual behavior in prisons, in the priesthood, and on na-
val vessels where access to women is limited) and "externality" 
(consequences of individual sexual conduct may be borne by third 
parties, e.g., the effects of HIV infection on unwitting sexual part-
ners or children in utero). Even love, according to Posner, can be 
given a precise economic meaning: "[I]t is a preoccupation with the 
unique particulars of another person, particulars for which there is, 
by definition, no substitute to be found in any other person." 
II. THE SEXUAL PAROCHIALISM OF THE ELITE 
Fortunately, Posner grants the reader of Sex and Reason fre-
quent and diverting respites from this economic grind. Long re-
marked for his interest in unexpected subjects such as literatureD 
13. See generally Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation 
(Harv. U. Press, 1988). 
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and feminism, 14 Part One of the book-an essay on the history of 
sexuality-is to my reading the most satisfying section. Part One 
reflects Posner's openminded appreciation for the great variety and 
diversity in human sexual conduct and culture. The nuance and 
scope of the essay reflects Posner's skillful synthesis of the bur-
geoning scholarship on sexuality from a range of disciplines outside 
the law, including anthropology, sociology, psychology, history, 
critical theory and gay and women's studies. Posner pointedly 
comments that lawmakers (and judges in particular) are danger-
ously ignorant about sex. Part One sets about remedying that igno-
rance, immersing the reader in what may be the surprisingly 
unconventional realities of sexual experience. 
To appreciate the spirit of openness and curiosity that marks 
this fascinating and competent summary of an impressive array of 
empirical research on sexuality, it is worth repeating Posner's expla-
nation for why he wrote Sex and Reason. For, as he acknowledges, 
sex is "not a fully respectable subject for public discussion in the 
United States" and "anyone who writes about it is apt to be thought 
a little off." Posner describes reading Plato's Symposium and find-
ing to his surprise that it contained an engaging account of male 
homoeroticism. Given the philosopher's unquestioned respectabil-
ity and canon authority, Plato's homoeroticism could not, to Pos-
ner's mind, be reconciled with the "ancient roots" attributed to the 
cultural loathing and persecution of homosexual conduct invoked 
by the Supreme Court in its 1986 Bowers v. Hardwick decisionts 
upholding the constitutionality of state laws criminalizing sodomy 
as applied to same-sex encounters. And plainly, one of the achieve-
ments of Sex and Reason is its far more accurate depiction of the 
tangled threads of celebration, tolerance and condemnation that 
form the Western world's complex historical response to male ho-
mosexuality-a rich and thought-provoking account that may serve 
in some measure to remedy the misleading, uninformed and, in Pos-
ner's words, "mean-spirited" history of Bowers. 
Posner has long been critical of the effects on decisionmaking 
of the judiciary's lack of social diversity. In an earlier book, 
Problems of Jurisprudence, Posner describes "[a] legal profession 
whose members have the same social and educational background, 
politics, religion, professional experience, and the like," and who 
14. See generally Richard A. Posner, Ms. Aristotle, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1013 (1992); Rich· 
ard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 191; Richard A. Posner, 
Problems of Jurisprudence (Harv. U. Press, 1990); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical Signifi-
cance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1431 (1986). 
15. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
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"tend to agree on the premises for decision."I6 When it comes to 
breadth of sexual experience, Posner observes in Sex and Reason 
that the judiciary is perhaps even more homogenous, dominated by 
older, white, heterosexual men. Relatively few women, even fewer 
racial minorities, and virtually no openly gay or lesbian lawyers are 
judges. Posner notes that preappointment investigations are 
designed, in fact, to exclude anyone with anything but a highly con-
ventional sexual past from the bench. Such a narrow frame of expe-
rience, Posner argues, leads judges to rely on what they believe to be 
"self-evident truths" in making crucial decisions about sexual rights 
and wrongs, overlooking or misunderstanding the real social differ-
ences and conflicts about sexual experience and morality in soci-
ety .J7 Posner remarks: 
It will be apparent to anyone who takes the trouble to read these 
opinions [on the constitutionality of laws banning nude danc-
ingis] that nudity and the erotic are emotional topics even to 
middle-aged and elderly judges and also that the dominant judi-
cial, and I would say legal, attitude toward the study of sex is 
that 'I know what I like' and therefore research is superfluous. 
Unlike the other conservative judges with whom he tends to be 
lumped,I9 Posner largely approves of the Warren Court's liberal 
sexual jurisprudence beginning with Griswold and culminating in 
Roe, and criticizes the retreat signalled by more recent Supreme 
Court decisions such as Bowers and the decisions cutting back on 
the right to abortion.2o In Sex and Reason, Posner convincingly 
16. Posner, Problems of Jurisprudence at 202 (cited in note 14). 
17. Where the political elite is drawn from a narrow strata of society and is closed to 
outsiders, Posner has observed that "law will appear-will in some sense, be--objective, im· 
personal. In just the same way, objective interpretation presupposes an interpretive commu-
nity that is homogenous." Posner, Problems of Jurisprudence at 202-03, 448 (cited in note 
14). Posner has also criticized as parochial the information sources to which judges ordina-
rily turn in seeking information relevant to making their decisions, noting the "systematically 
unreliable" nature of the factual accounts provided in judicial precedents, id. at 211, 87-100, 
117-18, and "the lack of scientific curiosity that is so marked a characteristic of legal 
thought." I d. at 213. 
18. See Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd 
sub nom Barnes v. Glen Theater Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2456 (1991). 
19. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the 
Law 110-26, 169-70,290-91 (The Free Press, 1990) (stating that Bowers was rightly decided 
and criticizing Griswold, Roe and general expansion of the constitutional right to privacy). 
20. Although Posner praises the outcome of these libertarian decisions on sexual free-
dom, he is not so impressed by their reasoning. Griswold and its successors probably have no 
legal-doctrinal ground in the Constitution, Posner comments, but he nonetheless observes 
that "[a] constitution that did not invalidate so offensive, oppressive, probably undemocratic, 
and sectarian a Jaw [Connecticut's law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to married 
couples] would stand revealed as containing major gaps .... (P]erhaps the courts are author-
ized to plug at least the more glaring gaps." 
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demonstrates that he not only possesses an independent and curious 
mind, but is libertarian in the most principled sense of the word. 
This places him at clear odds with contemporary social conserva-
tives, who believe in the unrestrained power of human freedom and 
creativity in the commercial marketplace, but seek to limit individ-
ual sexual, political and social freedoms. "[I]n sex as in other areas 
of life," Posner writes, "beware governmental regulation." 
III. THE IDEAL OF MORALLY INDIFFERENT SEX 
In place of the sexual conventions that dominate conservative 
thinking, Posner proposes a model of "morally indifferent sex" 
under which the laws and social attitudes that regulate sex are to be 
shaped by "practical, concrete, nonmoralistic concerns with the ex-
ternal effects of sex and with the use of force or fraud to gratify 
sexual desires." Posner describes the morally indifferent approach 
to sex as a "functional" theory, a theory that treats sexual activity 
as nothing more than a means to personal or social ends (whether 
procreation, pleasure or sociability), as morally neutral as the act of 
eating, and simply another "good" to be bargained for in the mar-
ket and on the road to utility-maximization. "The functional ap-
proach," Posner argues, "is resolutely secular, scientific in either a 
broad or narrow sense, and disinclined to view sexual activity in 
moral terms." Among such functional theories of sex, Posner in-
cludes his own, as well as sociobiological, Freudian, feminist, socio-
logical and anthropological theories of sex. Against these, he 
contrasts moral theories of sex, which begin either from a religious 
or philosophical perspective that sees human beings as "beings of a 
special worth and dignity, endowed with a moral sense and entitled 
to respectful treatment by our fellow man." Moral theories of sex 
see some sexual behaviors and drives as consistent with the unique 
human existence, and others not. Posner predicts that a morally 
indifferent regime of sexual regulation would be less restrictive than 
that which prevails today in the United States, which he ascribes to 
the Puritan heritage of our nation. It would resemble, instead, the 
modem Swedish society, which serves throughout Sex and Reason 
as Posner's socio-sexual ideal. 
It is certain that Posner's policy recommendations for a mor-
ally indifferent regime of sexual regulation will surprise those who 
associate social conservatism with the Law and Economics move-
ment to which Posner is linked: 
Marriage. Gradually substitute contractual cohabitation for the 
state-defined status relationship of marriage. Permit same-sex as 
well as heterosexual couples to enter such contractual arrange-
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ments. Protect women who bear children outside of marriage or 
a contracted-for relationship. Keep polygamy illegal because it is 
associated with low political and social status for women. 
Divorce. Provide compensatory benefits in the case of divorce for 
women who have sacrificed career opportunities to assist a 
spouse or partner. 
Single Parenthood. Deter sexual conduct that has significant ad-
verse consequences for society, such as teenage pregnancy and 
single parenthood. Make aggressive and explicit sex education a 
part of school curricula from an early age, and provide contra-
ceptives to teenagers. Fund government programs for prenatal 
and neonatal health care, and offer generous maternity and child-
welfare benefits, but condition benefits on the mother establishing 
herself in the job market. 
Pornography. Restrict only sexually explicit materials that in-
volve children or that harm adult models. Remain skeptical of 
empirical evidence linking violent pornography to rape. 
Homosexuality. Recognize same-sex domestic partnerships. Re-
peal sodomy laws and lift formal and informal professional ex-
clusions. Gradually integrate gays into the military. Include 
gays and lesbians as a protected class under federal, state and 
local antidiscrimination statutes. 
Sexual Coercion. Prohibit rape, incest and sexual harassment as 
they are today. 
Sex and the Constitution. Recognize a federal constitutional 
right of individual sexual autonomy under either a privacy or 
liberty rationale, protecting all consensual relations between 
same-sex and nonmarital partners, as well as access to abortion 
and contraception. 
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In every currently controversial area of sexual policy, Posner dis-
misses those who preach a return to a more regulated sexual regime 
and characterizes the prevailing American sexual moralism as 
"shallow," "obstructed by layers of ignorance, ideology, supersti-
tion, and prejudice," and generally lacking in respect either for em-
pirical fact or clear thinking. 
Posner's moral neutrality and hostility to religiously based mo-
rality links him to the broader economics tradition, as well as to a 
morally skeptical version of classical liberalism. Beyond their base-
line assumption that it is human nature to pursue self-interest, econ-
omists claim to be agnostic about the virtue or evil of what people 
define their "tastes" to be.21 By contrast, "[t]he main business of 
religion is," as De Toqueville reminded us, "to purify, control, and 
21. See George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 
Am. Econ. Rev. 76, 76 (1977). 
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restrain that excessive and exclusive taste for well-being. "22 The 
roots of this skepticism regarding religious and moral values can be 
found deep in the roots of the classical liberal tradition. As William 
Galston points out, the moral neutrality of the liberal state ex-
presses a fear of moral coercion that derives from the historical ex-
perience of the bloody English religious wars. In the mind of the 
political thinkers to whom Posner is indebted, nonsectarianism and 
tolerance for moral differences are vital to the maintenance of pub-
lic order.23 Posner's project in Sex and Reason is thus impeccably 
economic and classically liberal-nonsectarian, deregulatory, and 
tolerant of great diversity of taste. Hence, his agreeably libertarian 
conclusions. 
Despite the appeal of Posner's sexual libertarianism to social 
progressives, other aspects of Posner's economic analysis of sexual 
customs and practices are more troublesome.24 Posner explains, for 
example, that practices of female genital mutilation and female in-
fanticide (both widely practiced in present-day African and Asian 
societies) are arguably evolutionarily efficient: clitoridectomy and 
infibulation increase the value of the mutilated woman by reducing 
the cost (to men) of sexually sequestering her for purposes of ensur-
ing security about paternity; female infanticide increases the value 
of surviving women by reducing the supply. Posner is careful to say 
that his arguments for the efficiency of these practices "is not in-
tended to deny the case for reform." But then he goes on to gener-
ally justify these and other forms of subordination of women 
endemic both to historical and modem periods of human history as 
uncoerced, reflecting instead women's "choices" to assume 
subordinate roles in light of their biological and social conditivns. 
In Posner's theory, women choose to comply with what he terms 
"superficially misogynistic" practices-including genital mutilation 
and female infanticide-because of the constraints of biological 
logic, not as a result of the social domination of men. 
Other progressives will love Posner's conclusions, just as con-
servatives are certain to hate them. Philosopher Martha Nuss-
baum, for example, a strong advocate of civil rights for gays and 
22. Alexis De Toqueville, Democracy in America 448 (Anchor, 1969). 
23. William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods. Virtues and Diversity and the Liberal 
State 12 (Cambridge U. Press, 1991). 
24. Particularly to feminists; see Martha Albertson Fineman, The Hermeneutics of Rea-
son: A Commentary on Sex and Reason, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 503, 507-08 (1993) (expressing 
shock at tone of misogyny pervading Posner's discussion of female infanticide); Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Rumpelstiltskin, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 473, 484-85 (1993) (criticizing Posner's argument 
regarding female infanticide for ignoring the psychic diminishment suffered by surviving wo-
men who live with knowledge that society kills women for their femaleness). 
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lesbians,2s lauded Sex and Reason for its attacks on sexual bigotry. 
The conservative Washington Times, by contrast, opened its review 
of Posner's book with an ominous comment: "With a book like Sex 
and Reason, Richard A. Posner can forget about ever having a suc-
cessful Supreme Court nomination. "26 The enthusiasm of progres-
sives for Sex and Reason is not surprising, but perhaps premature. 
Because Posner is so identified with conservatives (rightly or 
wrongly), the sexual libertarianism of his book will surely have a 
greater persuasive impact than any similar effort by a progressive, 
feminist, or gay or lesbian thinker. Even though there is no neces-
sary (or even predictable) connection between one's theories and 
one's politics,21 readers inevitably take account of the author's iden-
tity-including his or her political image-in evaluating the signifi-
cance of certain arguments. Nothing is so persuasive as an apparent 
convert.2s 
IV. BIOPOLITICS: NATURAL MAN AND 
CULTURAL WOMAN 
It would be a mistake, however, to embrace Posner's broad-
minded policy preferences and ignore the theory that drives them. 
Posner's bioeconomic theory of sex could have long-term public 
policy implications somewhat less pleasing to feminists and progres-
sives than those that have drawn early popular attention to Sex and 
Reason. In fact, after such a rich and nuanced introduction to the 
range of human sexual practices and values, the simple and even 
reductive explanatory theory of Part Two of Sex and Reason comes 
almost as a shock. 
One might assume that a book whose purpose is to explain the 
rationality of sexual choices would accept as possible some mean-
ingful range of sexual free will and action. For if sexuality is fixed 
or determined by forces outside of human agency, notions like "ra-
25. Martha C. Nussbaum, Venus in Robes, The New Republic, Apr. 20, 1992, p.36. 
26. Mark Miller, Tabulating Reason Why Sex Has Social Price, Wash. Times, Mar. 29, 
1992, B8. This prediction was made during the Bush presidency, when Republicans appar· 
ently assumed that conservatives would be picking Supreme Court Justices for the foreseeable 
future. 
27. See Jack Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, II Cardozo 
L. Rev. 1613, 1625-30 (1990). Balkin has coined the term "ideological drift," by which posi-
tions identified at a particular moment in history with a given political stance come at a later 
point to be identified with quite different stances. See also J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About 
Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375, 383 (grow-
ing left-liberal support for state regulation of hate speech at odds with traditional leftist oppo-
sition to censorship). 
28. Speculation that Posner belongs amongst social critics began long before Sex and 
Reason was published. E.g., Scott Altman, Beyand Candor, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 296, 341 (1990) 
("Judge Posner should be every CLS scholar's hero"). 
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tionality" and "choice" are left with very little to explain. Thus the 
reader of Sex and Reason might expect Posner to begin from the 
premise that human sexual behavior is primarily shaped by individ-
ual or social factors as opposed to biological inheritance.z9 The so-
cial constructionist view emphasizes the plasticity of human sexual 
desire, and the historical and cultural contingency of sexual values 
and practices; it stands opposed to claims that sexual orientations, 
passions, or moralities derive from immutable sources, whether di-
vine or natural. For example, under the social constructionist view, 
it makes no more sense for a gay rights advocate to insist "I was 
born this way" than for Pat Buchanan to refer to homosexuals as a 
"perversion of nature." 
Yet curiously, Posner's theory of sex rests firmly on a founda-
tion of biological imperative, locating the answer to all of the big 
questions about human sexuality-the origins of the differences be-
tween male and female sexuality, the nature of heterosexuality and 
homosexuality, and the reasons for the virtually universal cultural 
practice of male dominance and female subordination-in genetics. 
Posner argues that sex drive, sexual orientation and gender hierar-
chy are genetically determined; social influences and individual 
agency come into play only in the type and frequency of sexual con-
tacts that a person may undertake in order to satisfy those biologi-
cally defined drives, identities or positions. In economic terms, 
then, sexual "choice" exists only in the substitutions that people 
make among options of varying costs so as to satisfy their fixed sex-
ual preferences. "The preference is treated as a given," Posner 
writes, "and the focus of the economic analysis is on the costs and 
benefits of alternative methods of satisfying the preference." 
Economists have argued that the deterministic quality of the 
analysis in Sex and Reason deprives Posner's analysis of any real 
economic quality.Jo But if the determinism underlying Sex and 
Reason makes the book less interesting as economics, it is the core 
of the book's interest as an expression of sexual politics. 
Sociobiology rests on the highly contested premise that obser-
vations of nonhuman animal behavior provide direct insight into 
human nature, and that human social institutions can be traced 
29. At several points in Sex and Reason, Posner does appear to align himself with what 
he terms the "social constructionist" hypothesis. He asserts, for example, that much cultural 
variation in sexual behavior and beliefs can be explained by a handful of cultural variables 
(economic status of women, urbanization, income, sex ratio, contraceptive knowledge and 
provision for government support of women and children). 
30. See Hadfield, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 481 (cited in note 5); Zelder, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 
1584 (cited in note 5). 
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back to biological bases.3I Although Posner acknowledges the sci-
entific controversy surrounding sociobiology, he nonetheless stands 
prepared, he writes, "to defend the sociobiology of sex against its 
detractors. "32 
Among the most challenged claims by sociobiologists are those 
that concern the sexual differences between men and women. Only 
the beginning point is uncontroverted and uncontroversial: Humans 
reproduce sexually, requiring both male and female genetic mate-
rial. From this one example of the genetic necessity for paired sex-
ual opposites, however, sociobiologists have gone on to justify as 
biologically innate a persistent pattern of gender hierarchy and a 
broad range of arguably purely social behaviors (male aggression/ 
female passivity; male promiscuity/female monogamy; male paren-
tal indifference/female parental nurturing). "Biology-the stable, 
ahistorical, sexed body-is understood to be the epistemic founda-
tion for prescriptive claims about the social order."33 Given the 
feminist analysis linking practices and values of sexuality to wo-
men's subordination,34 any theory that identifies both male sexual 
aggression and gender hierarchy as inevitable or immutable is cer-
tain to be both politically controversial and scientifically contested. 
According to the standard sociobiological script, women are 
genetically endowed with a weaker sex drive, can reproduce only a 
limited number of times in a lifetime, but know that the offspring 
they bear are their genetic issue. Men, by contrast, have an innately 
powerful sex drive, relatively unlimited power to inseminate many 
females during a lifetime, but little assurance that the offspring born 
to the women around them genetically belong to them. These pro-
miscuous males and passive females must pursue different sexual 
and reproductive strategies if each wishes to maximize his or her 
genetic gift to the species. Males must inseminate as many females 
31. "Sociobiology is defined as the systematic study of the biological basis of all social 
behavior." Edward 0. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis 2 (Belknap Press, 1975). 
Sociobiologists observe non-human animals, particularly primates, and seek to analogize their 
behavior to the human environment. Or worse, sociobiologists eschew empirical evidence of 
animal behavior altogether and speculate about what humans would do apart from social or 
environmental influences. The most detailed and influential critique of sociobiology as bad 
science is Philip Kitcher, Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature 
(MIT Press, 1985) ("Vaulting Ambition"). 
32. At one point in Sex and Reason, however, Posner hedges his bets, stating that even 
if sociobiology has no validity, his analysis "would be unaffected." Even if the origins of 
different sexual behaviors are cultural rather than biological, Posner claims, an economic 
analysis of how different biological and reproductive realities affect human choice would still 
be useful. 
33. Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud 6 (Harv. 
U. Press, 1990). 
34. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 127 (Harv. U. 
Press, 1989). 
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as possible, but cooperate in the support and rearing only of their 
own offspring; females must be sexually choosy, trading sexual ac-
cess for support and cooperation from males in childrearing. The 
"invisible hand" of natural selection supports these gendered agen-
das by preferring dominant men with powerful sex drives who will 
be suitably promiscuous, and jealous, coy and sexually manipulative 
females who will withhold sex as a bargaining strategy. According 
to this standard sociobiological script, it is from the negotiations 
between these sexual pairs that the persistent cultural pattern of 
male domination and female subordination arises in all its human 
iterations-including the double standard, rape, sexual competition 
among males and male control of female sexuality through institu-
tions such as monogamy, marriage, male jealousy, sequestration 
(harems in the East, "the private sphere" in the West) and repres-
sion or denial of female sexuality. 
In the past decade, scientists have disproved this prediction of 
passive females and promiscuous males as having been based on evi-
dence gathered using distorted observation methods.Js The revela-
tion of bias and bad science in early primate studies heavily relied 
on by sociobiological theorists has "revolutionized the entire field of 
evolutionary biology and the study of the evolution of behavior."36 
Primatologists, anthropologists and even many sociobiologists now 
reject the promiscuous male/passive female sociobiological script as 
male-centered in its theoretical premises and contradicted by the 
best scientific evidence. More recent primate field observations re-
veal a range of behaviors that violate the gender roles set out in the 
standard sociobiological script, including reproductive competition 
among females, female dominance patterns as an origin of social 
hierarchies, female promiscuity, female mate choice based on pater-
nal care tendencies and long term relationships between males and 
35. Early primate studies focused on the behavior of males and systematically failed to 
observe or analyze the strategy and choice underlying female sexual and social behavior. See 
Jane Lancaster, Introduction in Meredith F. Small, ed., Female Primates: Studies by Women 
Primatologists I, I (A.R. Liss, 1984) ("Female Primates"). In observation sciences, one pri-
matologist cautions: "we discount the unimaginable and fail to see what we do not expect." 
Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, The Woman That Never Evolved 89 (Harv. U. Press, 1981). As anthro-
pologist Marshall Sahlins puts it, "Before there is natural selection, there is cultural selection: 
of the relevant natural facts." Marshall Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason 208 (U. of Chi. 
Press, 1976). 
36. Lancaster, Introduction in Small, ed., Female Primates at I (cited in note 35). The 
criticism is not simply that early studies failed to fairly include observations of the behavior of 
female primates, but that the exclusion of systematic study of female behavior and strategies 
led to flawed and incomplete theories and conclusions about the determinants of primate 
sexual and social behavior. For a similar criticism of Posner's theory as excluding data con-
cerning human females to its detriment as an adequate economic theory of sexuality, see 
Hadfield, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 485 (cited in note 5), and Gillian K. Hadfield, Not the "Radical" 
Feminist Critique o/Sex and Reason, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 533, 535-36 (1993). 
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female involving male care of offspring not necessarily their own 
issue.37 Although these changed scientific understandings of male 
and female sexual and reproductive strategy has weakened sociobi-
ology's empirical claims as well as its explanatory power, the classic 
sociobiological thinkers on which Posner relies throughout Sex and 
Reason have not yet taken account of these advances in the underly-
ing biological science.3s Thus for all the interdisciplinary strength 
of Sex and Reason, the book is flawed by its failure to take account 
of improvements in scientific knowledge. 
In the complex modern politics of sexuality, however, argu-
ments for the biological origins of sex can find unexpected adher-
ents. Gay men, for example, have found a strong argument for 
tolerance in the assertion that sexual orientation is innate rather 
than learned. Not surprisingly, therefore, throughout Sex and Rea-
son Posner refutes traditional arguments for the social persecution 
of homosexuals, provides matter-of-fact accounts of same-sex eroti-
cism, and often writes with a tone of sympathy for gay men.39 Pos-
37. See Hrdy, The Woman That Never Evolved at 59-130 (cited in note 35). See also 
Barbara B. Smuts, Sex and Friendship in Baboons 81-122, 235-60 (Aldine Pub., 1985); Sarah 
Blalfer Hrdy, Female Reproductive Strategies, in Small, ed., Female Primates, at 103, 104 
(cited in note 35); Barbara B. Smuts, Sexual Competition and Mate Choice, in Barbara B. 
Smuts, et al., eds., Primate Societies 385, 392-99 (U. of Chi. Press, 1986). 
38. Instead, throughout Sex and Reason, Posner adheres to the traditional ;ociobiologi-
cal version of human sexuality •ecounted by Donald Symons, The Evolution of Human Sexu-
ality (Oxford U. Press, 1979), and praises Symons as having written "the best single book on 
the sociobiology of sex." 
39. Posner's handling of male homosexuality is not consistently sympathetic, h::>wever. 
His sturdy support for gay men stands in odd contrast with certain passages of Sex and 
Reason in which, for example, he recites without either citation or comment a detailed list of 
cruel stereotypes of gay men, ranging from "physical weakness and cowardice" to "promiscu-
ity and intrigue, prominently including seduction of the young," "concentration in a handful 
of unmanly occupations," and "a bitchy, gossipy, histrionic, finicky, even hysterical manner." 
For a thoughtfully critical review of Posner's treatment of male homosexuality, see William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason· Steps Toward a 
Gay/ega/ Agenda, 102 Yale L.J. 333 (1992). 
Nor has Posner signed on to the entire gay rights agenda. He disagrees, for example, 
with the political orthodoxy among gay rights advocates who claim that a stable ten percent 
of the population in any culture is gay and lesbian. Posner concludes that the number of gays 
and lesbians is perhaps only one to two percent of the population, and that there are many 
fewer lesbians than gay men. Posner also remains cautious about gays and lesbians adopting 
children, and would integrate gays and lesbians into the military only very slowly in order to 
give time for entrenched attitudes of homophobia to dissipate, and so as not to impair the 
functioning of the armed forces. Finally, Posner argues against legal recognition of commit-
ted same-sex unions as "'marriages" on the peculiar rationale that symbolic recognition of 
same-sex relationships would falsely convey the message that these unions are as satisfying 
and stable as heterosexual marriages: "[E]ven in a tolerant society the life prospects of a 
homosexual-not in every case, of course, but on average--are, especially for the male homo-
sexual, grimmer than those of an otherwise identical heterosexual." The government, Posner 
concludes, should not be placed in "the dishonest position of propagating a false picture of 
the reality of homosexuals' lives." Posner redeems himself somewhat, however, by question-
ing why the government needs to warrant the quality of any intimate relationship. He 
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ner believes (despite his acknowledgement that no conclusive 
scientific evidence exists for the position) that sexual orientation is 
genetically determined in gay men and therefore immutable. 40 On 
the basis of this belief, he urges a lifting of most sanctions on homo-
sexuality and the creation of legal protections against anti-gay 
bigotry.4I 
By contrast, Posner's account of lesbianism in Sex and Reason 
is markedly less sympathetic or engaged.42 Not only does he devote 
dramatically fewer pages in Sex and Reason to lesbianism than to 
male homosexuality, but he repeatedly uses the term "homosexual" 
generically to refer to gay men to the exclusion of lesbian women. 
Unless, for example, you accept Posner's unspoken presumption 
that all homosexuals are male, how else to comprehend the follow-
ing characteristic sentence?-"[F]or what it is worth, it has been 
estimated that 40 percent of homosexuals have some effeminate 
mannerisms." 
More than semantics are at stake in this elision of lesbian sexu-
ality. In Sex and Reason, Posner contends that lesbianism-like 
female sexuality in general-is more "opportunistic" than male sex-
uality of all stripes; that is, less often innate and more likely to be 
learned. The explanation offered is that women's sexual desire is 
biologically weaker than that of men, and thus their sexual release 
relatively less important as a force in shaping human sexual values 
and practices. 43 On the other hand, biology also determines that 
predicts that all longlasting intimate relationships, heterosexual and homosexual alike, will 
evolve into a form of contractual cohabitation that will replace the highly regulated status 
relationship of marriage. 
40. It is a troubling tendency of sociobiologists to make theoretical conclusions based 
on such speculation rather than on observable empirical evidence. As a theory, sociobiology 
is only as valid as the science on which it rests. "The dispute over sociobiology," writes critic 
Philip Kitcher, "is a dispute over the evidence." Kitcher, Vaulting Ambition at 8 (cited in 
note 31). 
41. Specifically, Posner argues for repeal of state laws against consensual sodomy, an 
end to barriers to openly gay and lesbian people entering professions (including the judiciary 
and the military), inclusion of gays and lesbians as a protected class under Title VII and other 
antidiscrimination laws, and legal rules permitting gays and lesbians to contract for perma· 
nent intimate relationships including many of the financial privileges of marriage such as 
insurance, pension and inheritance. 
42. For a critical review of the neglect of lesbians in Sex and Reason, see Martha 
Ertman, Denying the Secret of Joy: A Critique of Posner's Theory of Sexuality, 45 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1485 (1993) (describing Posner's "excision" of lesbians). See also Ruthann Robson, 
Posner's Lesbians: Neither Sexy Nor Reasonable, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 491 (1993) (scant treat-
ment in Sex and Reason of lesbians merely a rehearsal of the most superficial stereotypes). 
43. As evidence of this, Posner points to the negligible frequency of women's resort to 
prostitutes when unpaid sexual partners are not available. Martha Nussbaum has criticized 
this reasoning on the ground that it ignores the possibility that women may have a strongly 
held preference for intimate, romantic or "beautiful" sex, which would make prostitution an 
unsuitable substitute, see Nussbaum, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1716 (cited in note 3), but, for 
example, romance novels an acceptable substitute. See Ann Barr Snitow, Mass Market Ro-
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the social benefits from sexual connection are relatively more im-
portant to women because of their reproductive vulnerability (re-
member our sociobiological female using sex to "bargain" for male 
support). Because of these biologically fixed preferences, Posner be-
lieves that women are more likely than men to respond to changes 
in social circumstance by altering their fundamental sexual desires. 
Many lesbians, Posner speculates, have been "persuaded" into their 
sexuality by circumstance-past sexual abuse by men, or political 
beliefs hostile to men or to heterosexuality.44 By contrast, Posner 
believes that scientists will one day prove male homosexuality to be 
genetically determined rather than socially constructed. Posner 
thus takes the most forgiving position regarding male homosexual-
ity-that it is often biologically determined-and the most hostile 
position regarding female homosexuality-that it is the opportunis-
tic resort of women unattractive to men or of angry feminists exer-
cising a political rejection of sex with men. 45 
Posner finds further evidence that women's sexuality originates 
in culture rather than in nature in his admiring discussion of the 
modern Swedish state. He observes that in a country like Sweden, 
where women are freed from economic dependence on men by a 
generous social welfare system and no stigma on single mother-
hood, women become more sexually active and independent. The 
Swedish experience shows, Posner reports, that if women do not 
need male support or protection for themselves and their children, 
they become reluctant to marry, to give up control over their chil-
mance: Pornography for Women is Different, in Ann Barr Snitow et. al., eels., Powers of Desire: 
The Politics of Sexuality 245 (Monthly Review Press, 1983). 
44. With startling blitheness, Posner argues that men who hate women can still enjoy 
sexual intercourse with women, which they can experience as degrading and subordinating to 
the woman. Women who hate men, on the other hand, are unlikely to be able to play such a 
"private script" in their head during heterosexual encounters. 
45. Posner recognizes that these two stories about the origins of sexual preference im-
plicate quite different policy approaches for male and female same-sex lovers. Because gay 
men are "born that way," their same-sex desires cannot be unlearned, and social and legal 
intolerance of male homosexuality thus leads only to gratuitous suffering that advances 
neither personal nor social utility. On the other hand, lesbianism, as a learned lifestyle, could 
be "unlearned" with the help of repressive social policies. Furthermore, if lesbianism is 
learned, a society that wants to limit the number of new lesbians will protect developing 
minds and bodies from unsavory influences by denying custody of female children to lesbian 
mothers, firing lesbian teachers, counselors or child care workers, and marginalizing and 
isolating lesbian lifestyles in the media. Yet in Sex and Reason, Posner never explores the 
policy implications of his distinction regarding the causes of male and female homosexuality. 
Nor does he adequately explain why society has traditionally followed precisely the opposite 
social policy--directing fiercer punishments at gay men than at lesbian women. Given Pos-
ner's premises, the logical or "efficient" sexual policy would be to persecute lesbians, who he 
believes are open to incentives and deterrents, and leave in peace "unreforrnable" gay men. 
See Robson, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 500 n. 40 (cited in note 42) (harsher legal treatment of 
lesbians than of gay men possible policy implication of Posner's analysis). 
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dren to men, or to forego a freer and more active sex life for the 
strictures of monogamy. 
But if social factors have allowed Swedish women to depart 
from what Posner believes is the female biological inclination to 
sexual passivity and dependence, why is male sexuality not similarly 
responsive to changes in social circumstances? Throughout history 
and across cultures, Posner sees men substituting one sexual activity 
for another, but never sees the male sex drive or inclination to pro-
miscuity diminishing in response to social factors. By contrast, his 
discussion of Sweden concludes that when women are freed from 
the need to cultivate male protection, women's sex drive intensifies 
towards pleasure and promiscuity. At one level, this differential ex-
planation for what drives male and female sexuality is confusing. 
Does not this carry the idea of gender differences to extremes, deny-
ing an underlying and shared human experience of embodied life? 
The view that male sexuality is mostly natural while female 
sexuality is mostly cultural is not so mysterious, however, when one 
considers what sexual politics follow from such an original position. 
For several decades, there has been growing female resistance to 
male sexual aggression in all spheres of life. Much of this anger and 
criticism has been translated into calls for increased legal regulation 
and social condemnation of promiscuous, violent and coercive male 
sexual conduct, including reform of the rape laws, abolition of the 
marital rape exemption, creation of legal remedies for workplace 
sexual harassment, pressure to enforce existing laws against wife-
beating, incest and date rape, proposals to define pornography as a 
civil rights violation and legal and electoral defense of access to 
abortion and contraception. What better conversation-stopper than 
scientific "proof' that such efforts are doomed to fail because they 
run contrary to nature? The implication of "natural" is that some-
thing cannot be changed, or at least that society can change a natu-
ral tendency only by doing great violence to human well-being.46 
However just or fair feminist demands for changes in male sexual 
practice might be, such claims can be painted as vain and ultimately 
foolish if portrayed as running contrary to the laws ofnature.47 Ar-
guments from nature thus work to shut down women's efforts to 
46. Stephen Jay Gould, a preeminent Darwinian scientist but an opponent of sociobi-
ology, points out that "to see a biological influence in human behavior is to offer a reason why 
something cannot be done." Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man 330-31 (Norton, 
1981). 
47. Sociobiologists do not deny that humans may resist behaviors that are optimal for 
evolution, but they caution that social justice reforms that are contrary to the dictates of 
evolutionary wisdom will come at unmeasurable cost to the species. See Edward 0. Wilson, 
On Human Nature (Harv. U. Press, 1978). 
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change men's sexual aggression and promiscuity, but do so in a way 
that avoids the political opposition that would be generated by an 
above-the-board defense of existing patterns of male sexual behavior 
as good or just. With this neat evasion both of male sexual respon-
sibility and of political conflict, one begins to suspect a rationaliza-
tion rather than rationality at work in Sex and Reason. 
If claims for the "naturalness" of male sexuality amount to a 
covert defense of the status quo, the notion of an "acculturated" 
female sexuality presents a more complex ideological cipher. On 
the one hand, it is liberating for women to be released from biologi-
cal fate and freed to reinvent themselves as beings more multi-di-
mensional, individually determined and sexually expressive than 
simply the breeders of the species.4s On the other hand, this sugges-
tion of malleability opens up female sexuality to the risk of being 
"managed" as a social resource, directed towards whatever pur-
poses men, as the dominant social group, might deem useful or ad-
vantageous at a particular moment in history.49 Although feminists 
have rightfully feared the stifling constraints of biological definitions 
of woman's "nature," history seems to indicate that an equal or 
greater risk is presented by the open-endedness of purely cultural 
definitions of the "female." Within Western culture, so-called ex-
pert knowledge about women's sexuality has flip-flopped from era 
to era, ranging from St. Augustine's warnings about the uncon-
trolled lustfulness of the daughters of Eve, to Acton's conclusions 
about the passionlessness of the Victorian wife, to the Playboy Ad-
visor's use of modem sexology to affirm female sexual availability.so 
These swings of the ideological pendulum suggest that it is in men's 
48. Not to mention that if female sexuality were primarily biologically determined, the 
degree of social control that throughout human history has been applied to sexually control 
women would require some explanation. Unless female sexuality was not in fact naturally 
tame, society would not need to coerce compliance but could simply rely on natural un-
folding to ensure prescribed female passivity. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Deceptive Distinc-
tions: Sex, Gender, and the Social Order 10 (Yale U. Press, 1988). 
49. The figure of the "cultural" Woman also may reflect modern notions of an objecti-
fied and exploitable nature. See William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity 2 
(Blackwell, 1988) (modern "insistence upon taking charge of the world" reduces nature to "a 
set of laws susceptible to human knowledge, a deposit of resources for potential use or a set of 
vistas or aesthetic appreciation"). 
50. Until the post-Enlightenment period, Christian Church Fathers described women 
as "daughters of Eve" who were sexually uncontained, easily tempted, and dominated by 
lust. See Margaret R. Miles, Carnal Knowing: Female Nakedness and Religious Meaning in 
the Christian West 166 (Beacon Press, 1989). Victorians upended this lustful image with a 
new "scientific" truth-that women were sexually passionless by comparison to men. See 
Nancy F. Cott, Passionlessness: An Interpretation of Victorian Sexual Ideology, 1790-1850, 4 
Signs 219, 221 (Winter 1978). In 1903, pioneering sexologist Havelock Ellis announced that 
the notion of women's sexual "anaesthesia" had been a nineteenth century error. Havelock 
Ellis, 3 Studies in the Psychology of Sex 193-94 (F.A. Davis, 2d rev. ed. 1913). Modern 
experts emphasize that women are sexually responsive, and contemporary mores encourage 
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interest that women's sexuality be defined as whatever men might 
want it to be. 
The great danger of such biological arguments-e.g., that 
men's sexual nature is unreformable whereas women's nature is 
freely malleable-is that they tend to drift from descriptive prem-
ises (people are this way) to normative conclusions (people should 
be this way). Thus even thinkers like Posner, who make an effort to 
resist the reductionism and determinism that plagues biological the-
ories,s1 often fall into this naturalistic fallacy. For instance, sociobi-
ologists claim that knowledge of biology will lead scientists to favor 
one type of sexual morality or system of sexual values over another, 
and Posner uses sociobiology in Sex and Reason for precisely this 
purpose. Perhaps this temptation to transform moral questions into 
factual questions is especially strong in debates over issues so heat-
edly contested as human sexuality. The calm pose of authority 
adopted by so-called "objective" science holds out the seductive 
promise of unbiased and incontestable knowledge, rescuing us from 
the intolerance and partiality of sexual moralism and polemic.s2 
Sociobiology's aura of scientific certainty and "hard science" must 
be especially appealing to an economist like Posner; economists, like 
social scientists generally, are often attacked for the nonempirical, 
unproven presumptions about human behavior upon which their 
analyses rest.sJ Someday, biological science may well be able to 
map the intricately woven connections between genes and environ-
ment that leads to the overt and subtle choices that over a lifetime 
make up a human sexual identity and history. That evolutionary 
biology has not yet come within spitting distance of this certainty, 
however, must be admitted, which is why Posner's application in 
Sex and Reason of a highly contested scientific theory like sociobi-
ology to foundational matters of social equality between the sexes 
strikes me as indefensibly risky. As philosopher of science Philip 
Kitcher writes, "when scientific claims bear on matters of social 
policy, the standards of evidence and of self-criticism must be ex-
women to be sexually available. See John D'Emilio and Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate Mat-
ters: A History of Sexuality in America 334-39 (Harper & Row, 1988). 
51. At several points in Sex and Reason, Posner stresses the difference between the idea 
of a genetic limit on possibility, and the idea that genes direct certain behaviors. Genetic 
coding creates tendencies for certain behaviors, but does not determine those behaviors; men 
and women can and do abandon behaviors that do not suit present environmental circum-
stances. Evolutionary theories exact a harsh penalty for nonconformity, however; individuals 
may disregard genetically optimal behaviors, but if they do so, they won't reproduce. Thus in 
the evolutionary perspective, nonconformity is rare or dependent on spontaneous genetic 
mutations. 
52. See Fineman, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 509-11 (cited in note 24). 
53. See Carl N. Degler, In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Dar-
winism in American Social Thought 241 (Oxford U. Press, 1991). 
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tremely high."s4 But even if this far superior state of scientific 
knowledge had already been achieved, biology could not replace 
morality in human culture, as Posner hopes. One may hold that 
biology has constrained human behavior in certain ways without 
believing that this tells us much that we need to know about how 
one person ought to behave towards another in sexual matters. 
Just as troubling as the "bad science" problem, however, is the 
moral effect of sociobiological arguments such as those used in Sex 
and Reason. Resolution of moral questions comes in part from 
what the society understands about what it means to be a person. 
Once established-whether by science, religion, culture or philoso-
phy-these prevailing conceptions of human nature create a set of 
boundaries on the possible, defining how people are imagined to be 
capable of acting, and thus what we may aspire to as individuals 
and in our lives together. In our times, science has taken up the 
mantle of the church and tradition as the source for explanations 
about the nature of things.ss Thus sociobiologists purport to be re-
porting on a human nature that they in part have helped to create. 
In Posner's hands, the scientific account of what it means to be a 
person seems to promise great sexual freedom because it eschews 
the traditional hierarchies of feudal society and the moralistic re-
straints of Victorian modernity. The scientific voice claims to say 
nothing about how people should live their lives, but simply to place 
objective and neutral facts before individuals who can then make 
well informed, free will choices. But by grounding most of human 
choice in the human genes, standard accounts of sociobiology, like 
Posner's bioeconomics, are revealed not only as preserving of the 
status quo, but also as deeply pessimistic about the possibilities for 
human progress. 
Sex and Reason may not tell us much about men and women 
or about human sexuality, but it does tell us a great deal about the 
construction of a masculine sexual politics. And, as political theo-
rist Wendy Brown has noted, "these are very useful things to 
know."s6 
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